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## BERTRAND RUSSELL'S CONCEPTION OF NEUTRAL MONISM

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The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell's neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell's predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell's own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell's commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in *The Analysis of Mind*, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in *The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy* – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell's view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.